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Abstract
Background: This study explores the role of pleasure in decision making.
Results: In Experiment 1, 12 subjects were presented with a questionnaire containing 46 items
taken from the literature. Twenty-three items described a situation where a decision should be
made and ended with a suggested solution. The other items served as filler items. The subjects
were requested not to make a decision but to rate the pleasure or displeasure they experienced
when reading the situation described in the item. The subjects' ratings were then compared to the
decisions on the same situations made by the other subjects of the studies published by other
workers. The ratings of pleasure/displeasure given by our subjects correlated significantly with the
choices published by other authors. This result satisfies a necessary condition for pleasure to be
the key of the decision making process in theoretical situations. In Experiment 2, a new group of
12 subjects rated their experience of pleasure/displeasure when reading various versions of 50
situations taken from daily life where an ethical decision had to be made (Questionnaire I) including
200 items. This was followed by a multiple-choice test with the 50 situations (Questionnaire II)
using the same 200 items and offering the various behaviors. Subjects tended to choose ethical and
unethical responses corresponding to their highest pleasure rating within each problem. In all cases
the subjects' behavior was higher than chance level, and thus, followed the trend to maximize
pleasure. In Experiment 3, 12 subjects reading 50 mathematical short problems followed by correct
and incorrect versions of the answer to the problem (Questionnaire III), including 200 items. This
was followed by a multiple-choice mathematical test with the 50 problems (Questionnaire IV) using
the same 200 items and offering the correct and incorrect answers. In questionnaire IV, subjects
tended to choose correct as well as incorrect responses corresponding to their highest hedonic
rating within each problem. In all cases the subjects' behavior was higher than chance level, and
thus, followed the trend to maximize pleasure.
Conclusions: The results of the three experiments support the hypothesis according to which
decisions are made in the hedonic dimension of conscious experience.
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Background
In a provocative review article, Baron showed that some
decisions are not made on rational grounds as the subjects
do not seem to weigh the consequences of their decisions
[1] This is important because if true, such a phenomenon
would cast doubt on the rationality of the mental process
of decision making. In a commentary on Baron's article,
Cabanac proposed that this might be so because the
whole process of decision making can be hedonic rather
than rational [2]. This proposal was made on a two-fold
basis:
1) because behavior is a final common path [3], various
motivations competing for access to it must be able to
'talk to one another' in order to allow the brain to rank
them by priority order. Therefore, there must exist in the
brain a common currency allowing the trade-off between
motives and their ranking to take place as postulated by
McFarland & Sibly, 1975 and by McNamara & Houston,
1986 [3,4];
2) in a series of experiments, subjects were confronted
with situations evoking conflicting motivations. The solu-
tions to the conflicts were found by the subjects in maxi-
mizing the bi-dimensional sum of pleasures aroused by
both of the motivations pitted against each other. Because
the motivations explored in these experiments varied
widely, from physiological (hunger, fatigue, thermal dis-
comfort, pain) to psychological (eagerness to play a vid-
eo-game, to earn, or to save money) it may be postulated
that pleasure, and its counterpart displeasure, are the
common currency allowing the trade-off necessary to
achieve the ranking order for satisfying conflicting moti-
vations [5]. Hence, if this holds true, pleasure and dis-
pleasure – a non-rational experience-should be the
common currency used also for the ranking of priorities in
the process of decision making.
In order to test such a hypothesis Balaskó and Cabanac
studied decision-making in situations involving grammat-
ical choice in a second-language test, i.e. a situation where
no physiological motivation was involved and the process
of decision making was purely mental [6]. They showed
that subjects tended to choose grammatically correct as
well as incorrect sentences corresponding to their highest
hedonic experience. In all cases the subjects' behavior was
higher than chance level, and thus, followed the trend to
maximize pleasure. This result supported the hypothesis
according to which the key to decision-making lies in the
hedonic dimension of conscious experience. McKenna,
studying risk-taking behavior, reached a similar conclu-
sion [7]. Thus the trend to maximize pleasure seems to be
an important factor of the decision-making process.
The present work tests the above hypothesis according to
which the maximization of pleasure may be a substrate of
decision making in mathematics and ethics, fields where
one would expect pure rationality to take place. Three ex-
periments were done. In Experiment 1, theoretical ethical
decisions in unusual situations were presented in a ques-
tionnaire to subjects who were asked, not to make a deci-
sion but to rate the pleasure or the displeasure they
experienced in the situation as described in the question-
naire. The items presented in Experiment I, were those
used by other workers [8–11] in experiments testing theo-
ries concerning the process of decision making in non-
consequential decisions. In Experiment 2, new situations
of the ordinary life, including deliberately ethical out-
comes, were presented and the subjects' ratings of pleas-
ure were compared to a) the decisions they would make,
and b) to their own ethical assessments. In Experiment 3,
the hedonic responses of subjects, to mathematically cor-
rect and incorrect variations of the same problems were re-
corded and then compared to the behavioral choice of
correct solutions made later by the subjects themselves.
All three experiments were devised to test the hypothesis
that, in the situations where subjects make non-conse-
quential decisions or guess an outcome, they do not fol-
low a rational mental process but rather tend to maximize
mental pleasure, or minimize mental displeasure
Methods
Subjects
Thirty six students and staff members recruited on cam-
pus, males and females in equal numbers, were informed
of the protocols and gave their consents. Twelve subjects
served in each of the 3 experiments. The mean ages of
males and females were not signifantly different; the
mean (± S.E.) age of the groups were 24.7 ± 0.8 yr in Ex-
periment 1, 25.8 ± 0.8 yr in Experiment 2, and 33.42 ±
4.90 yr in Experiment 3. All sessions took place in the af-
ternoon. Only subjects in healthy condition were chosen
because depression, or other pathological conditions
might influence the affective tone and also the process of
decision making [12,13]. Each subject received fifteen Ca-
nadian dollars as compensation.
Instruction to the subjects
In all three experiments, the subjects received a question-
naire (Questionnaires 1, 2.a, and 3.a, for Experiments 1,
2, and 3) starting as follows: "Read carefully the texts be-
low. After reading each item give a quantitative rating of
the pleasure or displeasure you experience when reading
the situation and decision described in each item." The
rating was to be a positive, or a negative number corre-
sponding to the magnitude of the subject's hedonic expe-
rience. A positive rating would indicate pleasure, a
negative rating would indicate displeasure. Zero was to in-
dicate indifference. The scale of the rating was left to theBMC Psychiatry 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-244X/2/7
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judgement of each subject. The reason for not being more
specific with the instructions about pleasure/displeasure
rating, was that the hedonic experience being a Gestalt-
type archaic phenomenon it was expected that the sub-
jects would be able to use a little defined rating.
In Experiments 1 and 2, the following was added: "Warn-
ing: you are not asked to make a decision but simply to
describe your feelings evoked by the given situation. The
magnitude of the rating is left up to you; a positive rating
will indicate pleasure; a negative rating will indicate dis-
pleasure; zero will indicate indifference". In Experiment 3
(mathematics), the subjects were also instructed that the
rating should describe the pleasure evoked by the logic of
the item not by its nature. None of the 12 subjects in Ex-
periment 3 was discalculic [14]. All efforts were made to
dedramatize the experiment as anxiety was shown to af-
fect the mathematical performance [15]. The subjects
were instructed orally to read the questionnaires item by
item, slowly and attentively, and not to return to previous
items to check previous ratings, nor to modify them. In all
three experiments half of the subjects received Question-
naire 1 with the items presented in a randomly organized
sequence; the other half subjects received Questionnaire 1
with the same items presented in reverse order. In all three
experiments equal numbers of males and females received
each type of questionnaire.
In Experiment 1, the subjects received only Questionnaire
1. In Experiment 2, the subjects received Questionnaire
2.a, then, after completing it, they received Questionnaire
2.b, and finally, Questionnaire 2.c. In Experiment 3, the
subjects received Questionnaire 3.a, then Questionnaire
3.b.
The experimental design was 'within-subject', thus can-
celed the noise introduced by 'between-subject' method.
In addition, the method cancelled also the biases intro-
duced by a sequence of items on the same problem in a
within-subject measurement, by using counterbalanced
sequences in half the group of subjects.
Results
Experiment 1
Questionnaire 1
46 items were presented to the subjects. Out of the 46
items 23 involved clear-cut decisions and are the object of
the present work. The remaining 23 items described situ-
ations where the outcome did not involve decision mak-
ing but rather various situations with moral outcome.
They served as filler items and will not be referred to in the
following.
The items were carefully selected to be difficult, but not
over-complicated situations, usually pitting only two con-
flicting motives against one another. They were derived
from articles in the literature where subjects had been
asked to make a decision in hypothetical situations, thus
testing various theories related to decision making. Each
item ended with a suggested decision or action. The items
presented were translated very carefully from English into
French to avoid different framing in the present work
from in the original experiments [16]. For the same rea-
son, several versions of the same situations were present-
ed, resulting in counterbalanced series of items. All
subjects received a questionnaire containing all the possi-
ble alternatives. Only the order of the items presented to
the subjects, differed.
a) 2 items on how much to compensate the victims of a
minor train accident were taken from [11]. In the original
work the subjects were asked to give a monetary compen-
sation to the victim of a minor train accident. The engi-
neer sees a tree on the railway. In one case, he tries to stop
the train with success, but a passenger suffers from minor
injury. In the other case, he decides to do nothing, and a
passenger suffers from minor injury. In both cases the pas-
senger does not suffer of any financial prejudice. Should
he receive a compensation?
b) 2 items on how much financial compensation to be of-
fered to the families whose relatives died of a vaccine giv-
en to protect the population by mass vaccination, during
an epidemic although it was known that the vaccine en-
tails some mortality of its own, were taken from [9];
c) 2 items on whether or not to vaccinate your own child
during an epidemic when the vaccine entails some mor-
tality of its own, were taken from [9];
d) 2 items on whether or not to kill a fellow prisoner,
when this death will save the lives of two other prisoners,
were taken from [9];
e) the decisions to pass or repeal, a law rendering vaccina-
tion compulsory (2 items), and a regulation to prevent a
minor flu-type epidemic (2 items), were taken from [10];
f) the decision to redirect a loose train, or to do nothing.
In one case, 2 men are working on the loose train track,
but 3 other men are working on the track where you can
redirect the train or do nothing. In the other case, the
numbers of track-workers were reversed. This situation
was taken from [8]. Altogether 4 items combined the
above cases;
g) decision to operate or not, combining better or worse
outcomes of surgery than the disease, with the fact that the
reader was the patient or the surgeon (Annex 1), were tak-
en from [8].BMC Psychiatry 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-244X/2/7
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Altogether the seven topics above combined the above
cases, resulting in a total of 23 items.
Statistics
The results presented by other authors were expressed as
percentages derived from the population of subjects ac-
cepting or rejecting the decision presented to them. In or-
der to compare our results with the data obtained by
previous authors, we decided to simply match the num-
bers of positive ratings (pleased) and negative ratings (dis-
pleased), with the percentages available from the
literature. Thus, our results are ratios similar to those of
previous authors. The Spearman and the Kendall rank cor-
relation coefficients were used to compare the pleasure ex-
perienced by our subjects to the decisions made by the
other authors' subjects.
Results
As there was no difference between males and females, the
results were pooled. The mean duration of the sessions
was 47 ± 4 min.
Table 1 presents the results of items a to f, and Fig. 1 the
results of item g. Table 1 shows the number of subjects in
our experiment experiencing pleasure when reading about
a given situation (and decision) and the proportion of
subjects who decided to act in the same situation as used
in previous studies. Both series of numbers correlated sig-
nificantly: Spearman rank correlation coefficient 0.85, P <
0.001; Kendall rank correlation coefficient 0.75, P <
0.0001.
In Spranca et al' s original experiment, the neurosurgery
situation (item g), the subjects were asked to rate the
amount of goodness of the decisions presented. With re-
spect to this item, we were able to compare our subjects'
ratings of pleasure to the ratings of goodness obtained by
Spranca et al'. Fig. 1 shows the results; each dot shows the
group responses in seven different situations where the
proportion of risk and success were combined. The corre-
lation between our subject's ratings of pleasure and Spran-
ca et al' s subjects' ratings of goodness was significant:
Spearman rank correlation coefficient 0.82, P < 0.024;
Kendall rank correlation coefficient 0.75, P < 0.011.
Discussion
The situations presented to our subjects were those which
led Baron [1] to show that subjects often make non-con-
sequential decisions. This experiment was devised to test
the hypothesis that, in the situations where subjects make
non-consequential decisions, they do not follow a ration-
al mental process but rather tend to maximize their expe-
rience of mental pleasure, or minimize mental
displeasure. Confirming this hypothesis, our subjects'
pleasure/displeasure ratings of the theoretical situations
presented to them coincided with the decisions, conse-
quential and non-consequential, made by subjects in oth-
er experiments.
Table 1: Comparison of present hypothesis with results obtained previously by others (Experiment 1) RATIO OF POSITIVE DECISION 
is the number of subjects who decided to act divided by the total number of subjects in the given experiment indicated in references 
column; these ratios were found in previous studies as noted by references. RATIO OF PLEASURE RATINGS is the result of the present 
experiment: the ratio was achieved by dividing the number of subjects expressing pleasure upon presentation of the situation described 
in Reference, by 12 (the number of subjects).
ITEM REFERENCE RATIO OF POSITIVE DECISION RATIO OF PLEASURE RATINGS
Train accident Ritov et al. 1994 0.32 0.5
0.81 0.67
A&B disease Baron 1992 0.28 0.5
0.69 0.67
Child vaccination Baron 1992 0.74 0.67
0.26 0.25
Prisoner Baron 1992 0.12 0.08
0.88 0.67
Compulsory vaccine Baron & Jurney 1993 0.69 0.83
0.21 0.42
Compulsory gurgle Baron & Jurney 1993 0.66 0.5
0.21 0.42
Redirected train Spranca et al. 1991 0.28 0.08
0.31 0.33
0.66 0.42
00BMC Psychiatry 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-244X/2/7
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Evans et al. [17] described rationality as composed of two
elements: rationality 1 to reach a goal, and rationality 2
logic reasoning. For them, rationality 1 is the normal
process in a concrete situation. Rationality 1 therefore
may be considered the relevant rationality for our study
where maximization of pleasure occurred, i.e. in situa-
tions of conflict, choice, and decision making.
As expressed by others [18,19], the highly contingent na-
ture of decision behavior poses problems and renders the
field chaotic. The hypothesis tested in the present work
might cast some light on the problem, because what was
explored was deliberately shifted from the measurement
of behavior, or from the intention to act, to the subjects'
mental experience. The results of the present work showed
that the decisions made in theoretical situations presented
to subjects in other studies correlated with the feeling of
pleasure in our subjects. It may therefore be hypothesized
that there is a causality in the correlation.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was devised to eliminate the artificial as-
pects of the situations described in the questionnaire of
Experiment 1. Rather than hypothetical situations where
the subject would, for example, redirect a train and never-
theless kill some workers, or vaccinate a population and
cause some casualties, in Experiment 2 the subjects were
presented practical situations of their daily life, such as 'I
find a wallet in the street', or 'I am in a hurry and the traffic
light turns red'. Four possible behavioral responses were
combined in each of these situations, e.g. a) I leave the
wallet in the street, b) I turn in the wallet to the lost and
found office, c) I turn the wallet with the id. and credit
cards but keep the money, and d) I keep the wallet.
Questionnaires 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c
200 items were presented to the subjects. The question-
naire 2.a contained 50 situations each recurring 4 times,
with 4 different behaviors described (i.e. 200 items) to be
rated for pleasure/displeasure. The situations were all tak-
en in daily life and some of the behaviors were clearly un-
ethical, such as hit and run, income tax cheating, spying
on university examinations, etc. In ANNEX are some ex-
amples of these 50 situations. All subjects received a ques-
tionnaire containing all possible alternatives. Only the
order of the items presented to the subjects differed.
Once the subject had completed the ratings of the 200
items of Questionnaire 2.a, Questionnaire 2.b was pre-
sented. This questionnaire gave the 50 situations each
with its 4 possible behaviors as in a multiple-choice test
(see examples in ANNEX). Thus, the 200 items were
grouped four by four and the subjects were asked to circle
the item describing what they would chose to do in the
given situation.
After the completion of Questionnaire 2.b, Questionnaire
2.c was presented. It contained only twenty selected situa-
tions out of the fifty of questionnaires 2.a and 2.b, where
one of the behaviors offered was unethical. The subject
was asked to circle the item describing the most ethical be-
havior.
Thus the subjects successively rated the pleasure/displeas-
ure evoked by the description of themselves in various sit-
uations (Questionnaire 2.a), then decided what they
would actually do (Questionnaire 2.b), then they chose
which action was most ethical (Questionnaire 2.c).
Data processing and statistics
Each subject's responses to the three questionnaires were
compared to one another. We searched for the number of
times the decision made on Questionnaire 2.a would co-
incide with the highest hedonic rating (most pleasure or
least displeasure). Then the coincidence with the lowest
hedonic rating (least pleasure or most displeasure) was
sought. Since each situation on Questionnaire 2.a had 4
possible answers, the total number of coincidences occur-
ring by chance should be 12.5. Thus, the overall probabil-
Figure 1
Experiment 1. Ordinates: median of ratings of appropriate-
ness of various neurosurgical situations given by a group of
subjects in Spranca et al. (1991); abscissae: median hedonic
ratings of pleasure or displeasure given by our 12 subjects
when presented with the same situations. The line indicates
simple parametric regression to illustrate the relationship
between both variables. Both Spearman and Kendall rank
correlation coefficients indicated very significant correlation
of the two variables.BMC Psychiatry 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-244X/2/7
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ity of such a coincidence for the whole questionnaire
would be 25%
As there was no difference between men and women re-
garding the behaviors selected or the duration of the tests,
the results were pooled for the twelve subjects. The prob-
ability numbers obtained on each subject were simply av-
eraged for the whole group of subjects, and compared to
chance probability of obtaining the same results. Stu-
dent's t tests were used to compare actual results with
chance results. Tied ratings on a given situation were taken
in consideration to estimate the actual probabilities.
Results
The mean duration of the sessions was 59.6 ± 2.1 min. Fig.
2-left, compares the responses to Questionnaires 2.a and
2.b. The 12 subjects are on the abscissa. The ordinates
show the probability that the behavior selected would co-
incide with the highest hedonic rating (either the highest
positive rating, pleasure, or the lowest negative rating, dis-
pleasure) experienced when reading the item. It can be
seen that the subjects' behavior coincided with maximal
pleasure (or minimal displeasure) in a very significant
way. The dotted line indicates chance behavior (there
were 4 possible items with each situation, hence 25%
chance that the behavior selected would coincide with the
highest rating of pleasure). The difference between actual
coincidence and chance coincidence was highly signifi-
cant (Student's t test = 16.56, df 22, P < 0.001).
Figure 2-right, gives complementary information by com-
paring the worst ratings of items 1 to 200 of Question-
naire 2.a, to the chosen items in Questionnaire 2.b. It can
be seen that the subjects did not chose the behaviors that
had been rated as most unpleasant. On the average they
selected 0.96 ± 0.32 items that had been rated the worst
out of the four possible items on a given situation, i.e. less
than 2%, although the random chance of such a coinci-
dence would be 0.25.
Figure 3 compares the responses of subjects 1 to 12 to
Questionnaires 2.a, and 2.b. The number of times a sub-
ject had selected a clearly unethical behavior in Question-
naire 2.a appears as a digit above each dot. This was
known from the responses given by the subjects them-
selves to Questionnaire 2.c. The ordinates of Figure 4
show the probability that behavioral choices would coin-
cide with the highest ratings of pleasure. The dotted line
indicates random chance. It can be seen that subjects 2
and 6 did not select any unethical behavior and that the
responses of subject 4 coincided only once out of four un-
ethical responses. However, all other subjects chose sever-
Figure 2
Experiment 2. LEFT: Actual probability that the coincidence between highest hedonic rating of an item of Questionnaire 2.a
would coincide with the behavioral choice made in Questionnaire 2.b. Numbers in abscissae refer to the 12 subjects. The
dashed line indicates random chance for coincidence. RIGHT: The probability that a behavior chosen from questionnaire 2.b
would coincide with the worst hedonic rating in Questionnaire 2.a. The dashed line indicates random chance for coincidence.
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al unethical behaviors, and the probability of coincidence
with maximal pleasure was well above the line of random
chance (25%). The difference between actual coincidence
and random coincidence was highly significant (Student's
t test = 5.07, df 18, P < 0.001).
The worst ratings of the items in Questionnaire 2.a were
also compared to the assessments of the most ethical be-
havior given by the subjects with Questionnaire 2.c. Com-
paring the results to both questionnaires showed that, out
of the 20 situations selected for Questionnaire 2.c, 1.33 ±
0.33 (i.e., almost 7%) were considered by the subjects as
both the most ethical and the most unpleasant or the least
pleasant.
Discussion
Experiment 2 recorded the pleasure/displeasure experi-
ence of subjects who read statements describing them-
selves in situations of their daily life. The subjects then
indicated which items they would choose when the 4 pos-
sible behaviors were offered simultaneously, and this be-
havioral choice was compared to their hedonic responses.
Subjects chose the items which corresponded to the scores
describing the highest hedonic experience for this entry
(Fig. 2). The subjects also avoided the items which corre-
sponded to their lowest hedonic scores for this entry (Fig.
3). Such results are a prerequisite for the working hypoth-
esis to be true. However, these results do not permit us to
give a firm answer to our initial question: do subjects pre-
dominantly follow the direction given by their hedonic re-
sponses in their choices, i.e. does the correlation between
hedonic experience and decision indicate causality? Be-
cause the pleasure of choosing a behavior might simply
reflect a rational acceptation of social moral rules, the cor-
relation higher than random chance reported above be-
tween chosen behavior and pleasure, may simply indicate
that pleasure occurred after the most ethical answers had
been selected by the subjects.
In this regard the answers to Questionnaire 2.c provided
clear information. Although the number of unethical be-
haviors (as assessed from Questionnaire 2.c) chosen in
Questionnaire 2.b was never very high, these behaviors se-
lected were still highly correlated with their higher hedon-
ic ratings (Fig. 4). The percentage of unethical choices
corresponding to the highest hedonic rating was well
above random chance level. Thus, our subjects seemed to
rely upon their pleasure/displeasure response to choose a
behavior.
Yet, the subjects' behavior does not completely exclude
compliance to social rules from behavioral choices, even
in the situation involving unethical answers. The subjects
might still be basing their choices partly on ethical consid-
erations. For instance, a rule recognized ethical by the sub-
ject might be considered more as a social convention than
a deeply personal moral conviction. The fact that the most
ethical behaviors received in Questionnaire 2.a the worst
hedonic ratings in 7% of the cases would indicate that an
individual's ethics does not necessarily coincide with so-
cial ethics. The facts that the subjects chose 3.91 unethical
responses out of 20 (i.e. about 20%) and that 64% of
these unethical responses corresponded to the highest he-
donic rating within their entry would support the hypoth-
esis that hedonic experience may have priority over ethics
and that decisions are made by maximizing pleasure. This
result provide a first evidence that the link between pleas-
ure and decision making can be direct rather than mediat-
ed by a link between between ethics on the one hand, and
both decision making and pleasure on the other hand.
One may assume that compliance to one's own ethics pro-
vides more pleasure than compliance to social ethics.
Finally, Cabanac [20–22], showed that behaviors involv-
ing some sensory displeasure could be selected by subjects
when the outcome was yoked to a larger sensory pleasure
in another sensory modality, and theorized that the final
decision was reached according to the algebraic sum of the
Figure 3
Experiment 2. Actual probability that the immoral choices
made in Questionnaire 2.c, would coincide with the highest
hedonic rating for this item in Questionnaire 2.b. Numbers
on abscissa refer to the 12 subjects. The dashed line indicates
random chance for coincidence. On top of each dot the
number of clearly unethical decisions made by the given sub-
ject. There are only 10 dots because two subjects (subjects 2
and 6) did not select any unethical behavior.BMC Psychiatry 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-244X/2/7
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Figure 4
Experiment 3. TOP LEFT: Group median of behavioral choices from the 50 items in Questionnaire 3.b coinciding with the
highest hedonic rating to one of the four mathematical items proposing a different solution in Questionnaire 3.a. This figure
pools the right and wrong choices. The chance behavior is higher than 0.25 because the tied ratings, which increased the prob-
ability for coincidence, are taken into ccount. Wilcoxon matched pairs sign rank test = 5, P = 0.004. TOP RIGHT: Group
median of behavioral choices from the 50 items in Questionnaire 3.b coinciding with the lowest highest hedonic rating to one of
the four mathematical items proposing a different solution in Questionnaire 3.a. This figure pools the right and wrong choices.
The chance behavior is higher than 0.25 because the tied ratings, which increased the probability for coincidence, are taken
into account. Wilcoxon matched pairs sign rank test = 5, P = 0.018. Experiment 3. Proportion of coincidence of highest
hedonic rating in Questionnaire 3.a with behavioral choice of wrong solutions in Questionnaire 3.b, plotted against the number
of correct choices, i.e. mathematical proficiency. Each dot is the result obtained for a given subject. For the group: Y = 0.011 X
= 0.21, F-5.9, r = 0.61, P = 0.035.
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common currency, pleasure plus displeasure [5]. It may
be suspected that, when subjects selected clearly unethical
options in the present experiment, they also experienced
some degree of guilt. If they selected the unethical behav-
ior it was because the pleasure of it was larger than the dis-
pleasure of guilt. Because the hedonic experience is the
common currency for decision making, whatever their ex-
perience, their hedonic ratings represented the algebraic
sum of pleasure and of displeasure. However, in order to
eliminate completely any motivation implying a behavio-
ral outcome Experiment 3 was devised with mathematical
problems, i.e. a purely mental mechanism.
Experiment 3
To test the hypothesis that purely mental processes might
operate under the same mechanism as other decision
making processes, simple mathematical problems were
used in this experiment.
Questionnaires 3.a and 3.b
During the experimental session the subject received two
questionnaires, the first at the outset of the session, the
second after completing the first one. Questionnaire 3.a
contained 200 items containing 50 short mathematical
problems followed by their solutions in four different
forms (A, B, C, and D), i.e. 50 problemsx4 solutions = 200
items. Only one of the four A, B, C, and D solutions of
each problem was true (e.g. B). The categories A, B, C, and
D were arranged so that each category contained the same
number of true responses. Annex 3 (left) gives examples,
in various fields of mathematics, of the problems present-
ed under the items A, B, C, and D. The degree of difficulty
of the problems was below the average competency of a
fifth year secondary student. The four items A, B, C, and D
of a given problem followed by its solution were separat-
ed by forty nine other items. Questionnaire I began with
the A variation of question and solution N° 1 and ended
with the D variation of question N° 50.
Subjects were then instructed to give a magnitude estima-
tion rating of the amount of pleasure or displeasure they
experienced when reading the problem followed by its so-
lution. No special instruction was given on the rating, ex-
cept that the rating should describe the pleasure evoked by
the logic of the item not by its nature. N.B.: subjects might
have rated 'pleasure' of reading an item on the basis of na-
ture as well as logic (e.g. if they preferred geometry to
arithmetic, or to algebra); however, this should make no
difference on the overall conclusion since each item was
judged against itself in its A, B, C, and D variations. The in-
structions given to the subjects about ratings were under-
stood by the subjects who apparently had no difficulty
rating overall pleasure/displeasure aroused by mathemat-
ical problems since none asked for more information
about the methods.
When Questionnaire 3.a was completed, it was with-
drawn from the subject who then received Questionnaire
3.b. In this second part subjects received the same ques-
tions, this time in the form of a multiple choice mathe-
matics test with 50 entries. Each entry contained the four
A, B, C, and D proposed solutions to the given problem
(example in Annex, right). Among these four A, B, C, and
D alternative items in each entry, they were asked to
choose the one that they thought to be correct. The subject
was not allowed to write and was limited to mental calcu-
lation. As each subject was his/her own control, no atten-
tion was paid to the time of the sessions which were held
throughout the day. Half of the subjects received Ques-
tionnaire 3.a in a given order and Questionnaire 3.b with
the same 50 problems listed from 1 to 50. The other sub-
jects received both Questionnaires with the items present-
ed in reverse order.
I. General Results of Experiment 3
Presentation of the different scores
1) The number of mathematically correct answers to the
50 problems of Questionnaire 3.b were counted. This
number gave a score of the mathematical proficiency of
each subject. This score was compared to the mean value
of the 200 hedonic ratings given by the subject in Ques-
tionnaire 3.a, as a systematic checking of inter-individual
variability. This score was also compared to the mean
range of the subjects' hedonic ratings (i.e. the mean differ-
ence between the highest and the lowest rating within
each of the 200 entries). These comparisons were carried
out to check whether the mathematical proficiency of the
subjects would correlate with the scale the subjects used to
describe their pleasure/displeasure evoked by the items,
or with the difference between their maximal and mini-
mal rating within the same entry. The correlations were
calculated across the twelve subjects. There was no signif-
icant difference between the mean performance of wom-
en and men (men 29.17 ± 3.0 correct answers; women
26.8 ± 2.9 correct answers; Student's t test 0.56, P = 0.589).
For these reasons all results were pooled.
2) The hedonic ratings of Questionnaire 3.a given to each
of the A, B, C, and D items within each of the 50 problems
were compared to the actual choice among A, B, C, and D
items made by the subject on Questionnaire 3.b. That per-
mitted us to see whether the hedonic responses of the sub-
ject, evoked by the different versions to each problem in
Questionnaire 3.a, corresponded to the actual behavioral
choice made by the subject in Questionnaire 3.b.
Dynamic assessment of pleasure/displeasure during the task
The mean duration of Questionnaire 3.a was 68 ± 6 min.
Analysis of the results showed that the ratings degraded
with the number of items read from Questionnaire III, ir-
relevant of whether the subjects read them in order 'a'BMC Psychiatry 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-244X/2/7
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(from 1 to 200), or in order 'b' (from 200 to 1). The mean
ratings ± s.e. of items 11 to 20, pooling items a and b, was
1.7 ± 0.98; the mean ratings of items 181 to 190, pooling
items a and b, was significantly lower -2.15 ± 1.13 (Stu-
dent's paired t 2.47, P = 0.031). Therefore, the ratings de-
graded with time irrelevant of the nature of the items
presented since the items were the same for all subjects,
just the order of items changed).
The subjects took an average of 30 ± 4 min to complete
Questionnaire 3.b.
Mathematical proficiency
The number of correct choices in Questionnaire 3.b indi-
cated the mathematical proficiency of our subjects. The
minimal score should not be lower than 25%, i.e. 12.5 out
of 50 problems with 4 solutions each, since there was only
1 correct answer out of 4 possible choices to be made in
each of the 50 problems. The number of correct answers
given by our subjects fell between 15/50 and 38/50, i.e.
well above chance level (group mean result, 28 ± 2, Stu-
dent's t = 7.6, P < 0.001), but the broad range between
scores, 15 to 38 reflects broad differences in subjects'
mathematical proficiency. The subjects' mathematical
proficiency did not correlate significantly with either du-
ration to complete Questionnaire 3.a (F = 0.37, N.S.), or
the amplitude of hedonic ratings (F = 0.34, N.S.), or with
mean (F = 3.1, N.S.), maximal (F = 0.70, N.S.), and mini-
mal (F = 0.1, N.S.) ratings.
II. Specific Comparisons relative to Hedonic Ratings and Solution's 
Choice
Behavioral Choice
Table 2 gives the matching of the 12 subjects' behavioral
decisions for all 50 problems of Questionnaire 3.b, with
their maximal hedonic ratings obtained from Question-
naire 3.a. The presence of tied ratings to the various an-
swers (in Questionnaire 3.a) to given problems led us to
calculate the actual probability of coincidence of behavio-
ral decision with highest hedonic rating, for each problem
and each subject. Table 2 presents also these chance be-
haviors taking into account these tied votes; chance be-
haviors were always higher than 25%, i.e. 0.25 because of
the tied votes. Such a table should test the working hy-
pothesis. Figure 4 (top left) presents the median of Table
2 results for the 12 subjects. The coincidence of the sub-
jects' actual decisions with their highest hedonic experi-
ence was significantly higher than chance for coincidence
(Wilcoxon matched pairs sign rank test = 5, P = 0.004).
As a complement of the above result, Table 3 and Figure 4
(top right) test the worst outcome of the working hypoth-
esis: the matching of behavioral choice in Questionnaire
3.b with the worst rated items. Figure 4 (top right) shows
both actual and chance behavioral choice of items: the
group median of the actual behavior was significantly
lower than chance (Wilcoxon matched pairs sign rank test
= 11, P = 0.014).
Table 2: Comparison of actual number of coinciding maximal hedonic rating of an item in Questionnaire V, with behavioral decision in 
Questionnaire VI of Experiment 3. The 'Chance coincidence numbers are higher than the 0.25 one would expect, because they were 
obtained taking into account the tied votes.
S u b j e c t 1234567891 01 11 2
Actual coincidence 0.74 0.47 0.48 0.64 0.78 0.56 0.54 0.41 0.68 0.63 0.39 0.82
Chance coincidence 0.26 0.33 0.38 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.42 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.54 0.28
Wilcoxon matched pairs sign rank sign test = 5, P = 0.004
Table 3: Comparison of actual number of coinciding worst hedonic rating of items in uestionnaire 3.a, with actual behavioral decisions 
in Questionnaire 3.b of Experiment 3. The 'Chance coincidence numbers are higher than the 0.25 one would expect, because they were 
obtained taking into account the tied votes.
S u b j e c t 123456 7 891 01 11 2
Actual coincidence 0.61 0.50 0.42 0.54 0.58 0.43 0.50 0.30 0.60 0.46 0.36 0.75
Chance coincidence 0.26 0.32 0.38 0.38 0.34 0.25 0.5 0.32 0.35 0.34 0.50 0.31
Wilcoxon matched pairs sign rank test = 11, P = 0.014BMC Psychiatry 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-244X/2/7
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Choice of wrong solutions
Among the 50 problems of Questionnaire 3.b, subjects
sometimes chose wrong mathematical solutions. Of
course, the number of incorrect responses decreased with
increasing proficiency in mathematics. These incorrect re-
sponses provided important information because they
were a better test of the working hypothesis, since they
were not based on a rational knowledge of mathematics.
Table 4 presents the number of incorrect choices corre-
sponding to the highest hedonic ratings within their entry
(from Questionnaire 3.a) and the total chance to reach the
highest hedonic rating for each subject. Since not all sub-
jects chose the same total number of incorrect responses,
and since there were tied ratings, this result is expressed as
a ratio to allow between-subjects comparison. Figure 4
(bottom) shows both actual, and chance behavioral
choice. There was a significant difference between the me-
dian of actual decisions and that of chance that the sub-
jects' actual decisions would coincide with the highest
hedonic ratings (Wilcoxon matched pairs sign rank test =
5, P = 0.006).
Figure 5 shows that the number of coincidence of maxi-
mal hedonic ratings with wrong solutions increased with
mathematical proficiency (y = 0.011x + 0.21, F = 5.9, r =
0.61, p = 0.035).
Discussion
This present study recorded the hedonic experience of
subjects who read simple mathematical statements men-
tally, problem and solution, without the help of paper/
pencil or pocket calculator. All efforts were made to min-
imize the emotional stress which has been shown to im-
pair the mathematical performance [15].
Then, the subjects had to choose which items were correct
and this behavioral choice of correct answers was com-
pared to their own hedonic responses. Subjects chose
items which corresponded to their highest hedonic scores
for this entry (Fig. 4, Table 2). Such a result is a prerequi-
site for the working hypothesis to be true. The same con-
clusion may be reached from the behavior regarding the
worst rated items: Table 3 and Figure 6 show that the sub-
jects tended to avoid choosing the items that arose the
least pleasure or the maximal displeasure.
Although, these results are a pre-requisite for our initial
question ('do subjects predominantly follow the direction
given by their hedonic responses in their choices?') to be
true, they do not permit us to give a firm answer to it, be-
cause. the correlation between hedonic experience and de-
cision does not necessarily indicate causality. Pleasure
might simply reflect a rational knowledge of Mathematics,
the correlation higher than chance reported above be-
tween correct choice and pleasure, and that lower than
chance between displeasure and wrong choice, may sim-
Table 4: Comparison of actual number of coinciding maximal hedonic rating of items in Questionnaire 3.a, with choosing the wrong 
answers in Questionnaire 3.b. The 'Chance coincidence numbers are higher than the 0.25 one would expect, because they were ob-
tained taking into account the tied votes.
S u b j e c t 123456 7 891 01 11 2
Actual coincidence 0.61 0.50 0.42 0.54 0.58 0.43 0.50 0.30 0.60 0.46 0.36 0.75
Chance coincidence 0.26 0.32 0.38 0.38 0.34 0.25 0.5 0.32 0.35 0.34 0.50 0.31
Wilcoxon matched pairs sign rank test = 5, P = 0.006
Figure 5
Experiment 3. Proportion of coincidence of highest hedonic
rating in Questionnaire 3.a with behavioral choice of wrong
solutions in Questionnaire 3.b, plotted against the number of
correct choices, i.e. mathematical proficiency. Each dot is the
result obtained for a given subject. For the group: Y =
0.011X + 0.21, F = 5.9, r = 0.61, p = 0.035.
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ply indicate that pleasure/displeasure occurred after the
known correct answers had been selected by the subjects.
Pleasure may occur after a behavior, or may serve as a clue
occurring before the behavior. Pleasure occurring after a
response would be a reward. If this was the case in our
subjects, then we would not be allowed to assign a func-
tion to pleasure, other than a reward allowing the law of
effect to take place. Thus, the process of decision-making
could have been exclusively rational, i.e. according to an
algorithmic process.
In this regard the incorrect answers (from Questionnaire
3.b) provided clearer information. The percentage of in-
correct choices corresponding to the highest hedonic rat-
ing was well above chance level. Although the number of
mistakes in choosing answers in Questionnaire 3.b de-
creased, by definition, with increasing proficiency in
Mathematics, the percentage of our subjects' reliance on
their hedonic judgement did not change with their profi-
ciency in Mathematics; on the contrary good mathemati-
cians (i.e. those who picked up more correct answers)
tended to rely more on their hedonic experience (Fig. 5).
Our subjects, even those subjects who were 'good' in
mathematics, seemed to rely upon their hedonic response
to indicate their choice of item. The subjects' behavior
does not completely exclude rationality from behavioral
choices, even in the situation involving incorrect answers.
The subjects might still be basing their choices partly on
rational considerations. For instance, perhaps of the four
choices, two might have been clearly recognized as wrong,
and the correct answer was misinterpreted because of in-
complete knowledge of Mathematics. In this scenario, it
would be clearly incorrect to maintain that the "only" cri-
terion for choice was the pleasure experienced in reading
the chosen answer. However, incorrect responses corre-
sponding to the highest hedonic rating within their entry
would support the hypothesis that hedonic experience
has priority over rationality and that decisions are made
by maximizing pleasure.
In these cases pleasure alone motivated the subject to
choose the response. This was true even though fatigue
tended to lower the hedonic ratings; indeed, this influence
did not suppress the gradients of hedonicity aroused by
the various A, B, C, and D possible solutions to each of the
50 problems. Furthermore, as shown in Fig. 5, the coinci-
dence of choice of incorrect answers with highest hedonic
rating increased with mathematical proficiency. There-
fore, rationality as the key factor in the decision making
process is likely to be excluded. The large individual differ-
ences in fraction skills reported by Hecht [23] were con-
ceptual rather than procedural. Hedonic experience is
more likely to be involved in a conceptual than in a pro-
cedural mechanism, because the former is more global
and the latter more mechanistic.
The above conclusion would support previous results
showing that animals [24,25] and humans [26] readily
develop strong preferences for objects that have become
familiar through repeated exposure. Such an exposure ef-
fect [27] can take place even when the exposures are so de-
graded that recognition is precluded [28]. Such a
mechanism might have taken place in our subjects' deci-
sions to pick up the A, B, C, or D answer of a given item
when they were not sure of the right solution. If this was
the case, such a mechanism would confirm that the deci-
sion took place in the hedonic dimension of our subjects'
consciousness rather than as a rational process.
General discussion
The fact that behavior is a final common pathway entails
that the brain needs a common currency to compare all
motivations in order to rank priorities [3,4]. Thus we can
assume that pleasure is the universal common currency,
as already observed in the cases of several dissimilar mo-
tivations such as thermal comfort, pain, fatigue, hunger,
money [5], pleasure of playing a video game [22], and
grammatical choice [6].
It may be suspected that apparently paradoxical behav-
iors, such as impulsive behavior [29], maladaptive behav-
iors [30], absurd risk taking [7,31], reversal of decisions
[16], irrational (in the economist's acceptance of the
word) behavior [32], non-consequential decisions re-
viewed by Baron (1) and studied here in Experiment 1,
and the unethical choices made in Experiment 2, would
enter into the model if all the variables were under con-
trol. It would be of interest to explore these paradoxical
behaviors in the light of the present hypothesis. Tversky
and Kahneman [33] described choice as a maximization
process but reached the conclusion that the logic of choice
does not provide an adequate basis for a descriptive theo-
ry of decision makin. It may be suggested, therefore, that
what is maximized is pleasure. Such a suggestion moves
deliberately from the point of view of behavior or of the
quantification of external reward, i.e. to expected pleas-
ure, to that of actual mental experience. Finally, although
they were clearly instructed to rate the "pleasure they ex-
perience", the subjects might have rated the pleasure they
would expect from the decision described in the question-
naires. If this were the case the causality would run in the
opposite direction as that which is proposed in the
present work. However, such a hypothesis may likely be
rejected because in other experiments where no moral
outcome nor behavioral action was expected (video game,
grammar, mathematics) the subjects behaved in a way
similar to that of ethical decisions, although in these ex-BMC Psychiatry 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-244X/2/7
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periments no expected pleasure could have taken place in
their minds [6,34].
"Pleasure has a central role in human life" [35]. The re-
sults of the present experiments allow a tentative general-
ization on the role of pleasure in the process of decision-
making. The optimization of behavior (from a physiolog-
ical point of view) was demonstrated previously to be
based on the maximization of sensory pleasure [5]. Prince
and Smolensky [36] recently proposed that grammar cor-
responds to some optimal function of the nervous system.
As well, in decisions involving grammar in a second-lan-
guage test, ratings of experienced pleasure indicated the
decision, right or wrong, the subjects would eventually
make [6]. Such an optimization of mental functioning
was also suggested by studies of pleasure experienced dur-
ing the reading of poems, and the playing of video game
[34]. In these experiments where subjects were asked to
assess their comprehension of poems and, independently,
to record their pleasure/displeasure reactions to the same
poems, pleasure was found to be a good indicator of com-
prehension. In a video-game of golf, a purely mental exer-
cise, higher performance coincided with more positive
hedonic responses. Thus, pleasure was correlated with ef-
ficient mental functioning. These series of results, as well
as the present ones, would support the hypothesis that de-
cision making is not, or is not totally, a rational process
tending to maximize expected pleasure as emerges from
the recent literature, but rather is a non-rational process
tending to maximize experienced pleasure. Recent reviews
on judgement and decision making have underlined the
limits of rationality in decision making.
The influence of pleasure/displeasure on the decision-
making process was already proposed for humans [7,18],
and for animals [37,38], because a decision is pleasant as
such when it permits to escape unpleasant conflicts of
motivations [39]. Kahneman and Tversky attempted to
describe choices in terms of numerical functions-utility
and weights over probabilities. They called these "pros-
pect theory" and "cumulative prospect theory" [40,41].
Thaler and Johnson [42] called "hedonic editing" the fact
that subjects deliberately put their options in the best pos-
sible frame. Khrennikov [43] proposed a mathematical
model "which is not based on the rule of reason". Fantino
[44] theorized that humans "are practical information
processors who select good or useful news but avoid bad
news." More to the point of our present conclusion, Roth
and Erev proposed that decisions are made on a low ra-
tionality process, essentially from a maximized reinforce-
ment [45,46]. Of course we do not suggest that rationality
plays no role in mathematics or in ethics. However the
present results suggest that hedonicity is also involved.
Yates et al. recently showed that when subjects could ra-
tionalize their decisions, cultural differences took place in
their decisions (between Japanese subjects on the one
hand, and both Chinese and American subjects on the
other hand); however these cultural differences disap-
peared completely when subjects had to guess a solution
[47]. This would suggest that two processes can take place
in decision making, a rational one when the subject is
equipped with the necessary information and cultural
background, and hedonic when the subject cannot ration-
alize. This hedonic mechanism being more archaic, for
obvious reasons provided by physiology and zoology
[5,47], would be common to all humans and would take
place when rationality does not provide a solution.
Mellers et al. recognized that frameworks alternative to ra-
tionality must be proposed: "These frameworks view deci-
sions as more reasonable and adaptive than previously
thought. For example, "rule following," which occurs
when a rule or norm is applied to a situation, often mini-
mizes effort and provides satisfying solutions that are
"good enough," though not necessarily the best. When
rules are ambiguous, people look for reasons to guide
their decisions. They may also let their emotions take
charge" [48]. In the same line of reasoning, it was recently
suggested that emotions, i.e. a process related to the he-
donic sphere, are the clue leading to efficacious decision
making [49,50]. Furthermore, in neurological patients
with damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortices, it has
been shown that the absence of emotion/feeling can pro-
duce very detrimental effects on decision-making [51,52].
Moreover, it has been shown that the influences of emo-
tion/feeling on decision-making can actually precede con-
scious rational cognitive processes [53]. The study of
mental experience may be a way to solve all the apparent
contradictions to rationality pointed out by the various
authors above. Kahneman and Tversky [54] have shown
that an option may depend on a negative consequence ex-
perienced as a cost, i.e., expected displeasure. They pro-
posed the term 'experience value', to distinguish the
hedonic dimension of motivation from the more algorith-
mic 'decision value'. Roth and Erev proposed also that de-
cisions are made on a low rationality process, essentially
from a maximized reinforcement [45,46]. Linville [55]
suggested that affectivity enters into play in a somewhat
additive process in a way similar to that occurring between
various conflicting motivations, both physiological and
psychological ones as proposed by Cabanac [5,21,22].
The neural substrate of pleasure is still little known. Neu-
rophysiological evidence though, pointing to the exist-
ence of a common currency in rats between palatable taste
and intracranial electrical reward, was recently reported
[56]. The influence of pleasure/displeasure on decision
making is therefore likely to be a phylogenetically inherit-
ed mechanism.BMC Psychiatry 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-244X/2/7
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Conclusions
In conclusion, our present results show that the pleasure
experienced when reading the written description of a giv-
en behavior or of the solution of a mathematical problem
was correlated with the subjects' eventual decision regard-
ing this item. They suggest that the pleasure/displeasure
experienced indicates the right solution at the time of a
choice in ethical tests or other decisions and provides the
clues for decisions whether the appropriate rules for a cor-
rect choice are known or not. The coincidence of choices
of behaviors recognized as unethical by the subjects, and
of wrong mathematical solutions with highest hedonic ex-
perience, is especially eloquent from this point of view.
The present results support the hypothesis that maximiza-
tion of experienced pleasure (i.e. experience value), and
its counterpart minimization of displeasure, occurs in the
process of decision making. The results are consistent with
the claim that non-rational processes contribute to deci-
sion making, but the results do not support any claim
stronger than that. We do not know the nature of these
non-rational processes. They could be hedonic or they
could be more general. They could be informational or
they could be motivational. Neuroscientific studies by
Damasio, Bechara and colleagues, have addressed the
physiological basis of these processes [51–53]. These stud-
ies have provided compelling evidence for the role of vis-
ceral/somatic states, or brain representations of these
body states, in biasing decisions in a way that is advanta-
geous to the organism. This is quite consistent and sup-
ported by the evidence presented here that pleasures and
hedonics play an influential role in decision-making.
Of course, when all the needed information is provided to
subjects rationality and hedonicity tend to coincide [57].
It follows that the present results do not prove the point
under test, i.e. they do not satisfy a necessary and sufficient
condition to reach the conclusion that this is the mecha-
nism allowing decision. However, the fact that they satisfy
a necessary condition for this conclusion to be true, entails
that the hypothesis that the key to decision-making lies in
the hedonic dimension of the mental experience [5] must
be taken as a serious possibility.
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